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waived in the Stipulation, thereby precluding the trial court from
hearing evidence on that issue (res judicata)[R.129]; and
Whether an action in fraud or secreting of assets may be heard
in a petition to modify a decree of divorce.
A.

[R. 129, 130]

STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW

In this case the Court is presented with a question of law
regarding whether the Appellee may file a Petition to Modify a
Divorce Decree based on an allegation of fraud or the secreting of
assets.

Questions of law are reviewed for correctness.

State v.

Levva, 951 P.2d 738, 739-742 (Utah 1997). The issue of whether the
question of fraud was already raised or whether it was waived by
the Stipulation is a question of fact which the court reviewed for
an abuse of discretion.

Toone v. Toone, 952 P.2d 112, 114 (Utah

App. 1998) (quoting Hill v. Hill, 841 P.2d 722, 724 (Utah App.
1992)).

The trial court's decision on a question of fact is

entitled to a presumption of validity (Ruhsam v. Ruhsam, 742 P.2d
123, 124 (Utah App. 1987)).
B.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
It is unclear what issues Appellant intended to appeal.

Appellant's Motion to Dismiss [R. 97] raises only the issue of
whether Plaintiff's failure to respond to discovery requests
regarding financial records constitutes a basis for a Petition to
Modify.

The motion then states that the issues raised in the

Memorandum

[R. 99] are incorporated as additional reasons to

dismiss the Petition.

The issues raised in the Memorandum are:

2

A. Did the Appellee by entering into a stipulation waive
the issue of fraud or secreting of assets? [R.99, Introduction]
B.

Is the property settlement modifiable?

[R.100, 101]

C. Has the Appellee failed to show a substantial change
of circumstances?
D.

[R. 101]

Can a party's failure to provide documents be a

consideration as to change of circumstances in a Petition to
Modify? [R. 103]
The trial court made its own interpretation of the issue and
in its ruling [R. 129] focused only on the issue of whether the
allegation of fraud by secreting of assets was waived in the
stipulation that preceded entry of the decree.

3

[R.129-130]

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES

A.

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 530-3-5(3);

The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent
changes or new orders for the custody of the children and
their support, maintenance, health and dental care, and for
distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is
reasonable and necessary.
B.

RULE 6-404(1):

Modification of divorce decrees.
(1) Proceedings to modify a divorce decree shall be commenced
by the filing of a petition to modify in the original divorce
action . . . "

4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE

Respondent, Randee Bayles (hereinafter "Randee" and Jeroldene
Bayles, now known as Jeroldene Bailey (hereinafter "Jeroldene),
were married on March 13, 1971.

During a substantial portion of

their married life, the parties engaged in a drilling exploration
business, namely "Bayles Exploration".

Shortly after the parties

were married, Jeroldene became the bookkeeper and maintained the
various records of the business.

The parties became estranged,

which resulted in the filing of a divorce complaint, dated January
27, 1997.
A hearing on an Order to Show Cause was held on February 6,
1997, in which the trial court awarded the home and business
property, which included the office of Bayles Exploration, to
Randee.

As Randee began reviewing the business records in an

attempt to take over the financial management of the business and
file tax returns, he became aware of certain irregularities in the
business transactions, which included payment of all marital debts
out of corporate accounts, a practice which had not occurred until
the months just prior to the filing of the divorce.

He observed

the outlay of double utility payments and car payments, apparently
done by Jeroldene in anticipation of being awarded the home and
other property.
At
records.

this time, Randee began requesting missing

business

A letter dated May 7, 1997 [R. 105, 106], was sent to
5

Douglas Terry, then counsel for Jeroldene, outlining some of the
difficulties in the case.
establish

as

of

the

[R. 105,106]

date

of

the

Randee had been able to

writing

of

the

letter,

irregularities which are set forth on the second page of the
letter.

Randee further stated that "at the current time we do not

have all of the necessary information with regard to necessary
adjustments, however, some of the noteworthy items are. . ."
Prior to a hearing of the matter, the parties entered into
negotiations in which the various aspects then known to Randee were
discussed and the parties ultimately entered into a stipulation.
The corporate records of Bayles Exploration had still not been
transferred by Jeroldene even though numerous requests were made
through counsel and directly by Randee. [R. 84, 86] [R. 89-94]
Specific items which were known by Randee to be problematic at the
time of the divorce are set forth verbatim in the Stipulation [R.
45, 46 (paragraph 17)], the Findings of Fact [R. 53,54 (paragraph
17)] and the Decree [R. 61,62 (paragraph 17)].
The parties stipulated [R. 46 (paragraph 19) that Jeroldene
would provide the records of the corporation, which provision of
the

stipulation

was

adopted

in

the

Findings

of

Fact

[R.54

(paragraph 19)] and the Decree [R.62 (paragraph 19)].
At the time of the proceeding before the trial court, none of
the information had been turned over to Randee.

Subsequent to the

entry of the Decree, Randee discovered that numerous checks had
been drawn and/or signed by Jeroldene, which Jeroldene had not

6

divulged, nor had these funds been considered in the divorce
proceeding.
As of the date of this writing, the corporate records have
still not been turned over to Randee.

Randee obtained banking

records and photo copies of checks which indicated that various
business checks had been forged. [R.91 (paragraph 11)]. Based upon
this information Randee filed a Petition to Modify asking that the
court consider that there were substantial funds which were not
considered in the original divorce action.
The Appellant requested that the court dismiss the Petition to
Modify

and

adjudicated.

contends

that

the

matter

of

fraud

was

already

The District Court denied the motion on June 16,

1998, from which this appeal was taken.
B.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

Appellee adopts the Course of Proceedings as outlined in the
Appellant's brief and believes that the dates and documents as set
forth are accurate.
C.

DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW

No evidentiary hearing has been held nor any evidence taken to
determine whether the Petition to Modify has merit.

No findings

have been made with regard to any of the allegations of Randee, the
Appellee.

The Petition was verified and supported by affidavits.

Upon denial of the Motion to Dismiss the proceedings were stayed
pending outcome of the appeal on the interlocutory order.

7

D.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Divorce Complaint was filed in this matter on January 27,
1997, and Defendant's verified Answer and Counterclaim were filed
on February 3, 1997. A hearing was held on reciprocal Orders to
Show Cause on February 6, 1997. At the time of the hearing Randee
requested that he be allowed to remain in the home as the office
for the business was in the marital residence and this was the
repository of the business records.

[R. 18 (paragraphs 4, 5)]

Randee was granted temporary possession of the home and discovered
that the business ledgers and records had been removed.
Randee began requesting the records for the purpose of
carrying on the ongoing operations of the business and preparing
taxes.

Jeroldene never complied with those requests.

(See

Affidavit in Support of Motion in Re Contempt R. 39f paragraph 15)
Jeroldene changed counsel and Douglas Terry entered his
appearance by filing a Motion to Bifurcate on May 1, 1997. It was
anticipated that the court would take evidence with regard to
granting the divorce and hold all property issues for a later time.
The parties then entered into discussions to resolve the property
issues; Mr. Terry then expressed his desire to resolve all of the
issues at one time rather than making two trips from St. George to
Monticello.

At this time Randee had been in possession of the

marital residence and had recognized that there were personal and
business items and records which were missing.
Randee discovered that various personal bills had recently
been paid from corporate accounts, which had not been the business
8

practice.

These items were addressed in the letter of May 7

[R.105].

It was

clear, however, that

Randee

had

additional

concerns and did not have the ability to resolve them because he
did not have the business records. At no place in the letter does
he mention forgery nor did he express the amount of $17,000 which
he believes was removed by Jeroldene from the business assets by
way of forgery.

There is an indication that Jeroldene made had

kept all her income
company,

yet

Exploration.

paid

and accepted

all

of

substantial income from the

the marital

bills

from

the

Bayles

The letter further states that the lack of having the

necessary documentation has caused Mr. Bayles to be unable to make
appropriate decisions with regard to the vitality of the business
or necessary adjustments to be made in the settlement, wherein the
letter states:
"We have made several requests that Jeroldene turn over
the business records but have failed to receive these
documents and so have drafted discovery to force the
issue. I don't believe Jeroldene is entitled to retain
the original business records and we may bring this
before the court. At the current time we do not have all
the necessary information with regard to the necessary
adjustments, however, some of the noteworthy items are:
$3000 cash kept in the safe in the home
double payments on the car
double utility payments
frozen beef worth approximately $750 which
Jeroldene took
telephone charges for February, March and
April charged to Randee•s card
credit card charges involving personal items
which were paid from business funds
cost of preparation of tax returns
liability for corporate taxes for 1996"
The only items known to Randee were the items set forth in the
letter and appear verbatim in the Stipulation

9

[R.45], Findings

[R.53] and Decree [R.61], wherein it states that "Defendant waives
any claims with respect

to those items listed

attorney letter dated May 7, 1991,

in Defendant's

to-wit; . . . " (Emphasis added).

In the Stipulation [R.46], Findings of Fact [R.54] and the
Decree [R.62], the court found that it was reasonable and the court
ordered that the business records be turned over to Randee. Randee
filed a subpoena to obtain banking records on July 22, 1997, for
the

purpose

of

trying

to

determine

the

status

of

Bayles

Exploration. Based upon the obtention of some records, he was able
to discover that additional funds not contemplated in the letter,
Stipulation, Findings or Decree had been fraudulently removed from
the business through Jeroldene's forgery.
regarding

these

funds

was

set

forth

The first allegation
in

the

Petition

for

Modification filed on November 19, 1997 [R.76 - 78] and Affidavit
of Defendant [R.89-94].
No testimony or evidence has ever been given with regard to
the merits of Randee*s Petition to Modify.

Before the action was

set for hearing Jeroldene filed a motion for an interlocutory
appeal contesting the court's determination that Randee could file
a petition to modify a divorce decree, wherein he alleged that
there had been fraud in the original divorce proceeding, with the
opposing party secreting assets.

10

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
This appeal comes before the Court on a narrow issue.

The

district court determined that Randee's Petition to Modify alleging
fraud or the secreting of assets was appropriately brought in a
Petition to Modify.

From that decision Jeroldene has appealed

alleging that the court made an improper decision that there was a
substantial change of circumstances.

The district court did not

make any finding or hear any evidence with regard to whether there
was a substantial change of circumstances.

There was no hearing,

there is no evidence and there are no findings of fact from which
this Court can determine whether an appropriate decision was made
on the issue of change of circumstances.

For this reason the

claims of Jeroldene are premature and must be remanded to the
district

court

with

regard

to

whether

Randee's

allegations

constitute a substantial change of circumstances sufficient for the
property settlement in the decree to be modified.
The issue of fraud, forgery or secreting of assets, if allowed
to be shown at a proper hearing, is appropriately brought in a
petition to modify.
If the district court were to determine, after hearing
evidence, that fraud, forgery or secreting of assets had occurred
and had not been litigated in the original proceedings, this issue
would not be res judicata and would be appropriate for the court to
consider in a petition to modify the divorce decree.
The failure of Jeroldene to provide appropriate corporate
records in the face of numerous requests by Randee prevented Randee

11

from presenting

his

case

fully

or

from

having

all

of the

information needed to allow him to pursue effectively his claims in
the original divorce proceedings, and thus prevented Randee from
receiving a determination on the merits with regard to the assets
he believes were obtained by deception.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1: APPELLEE IS ENTITLED TO A HEARING TO DETERMINE IF THE
ISSUES RAISED IN HIS PETITION TO MODIFY HAVE ALREADY BEEN
LITIGATED AND TO DETERMINE IF THERE HAS BEEN A
SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES.
FINDINGS ARE
REQUIRED.
The central theme of Jeroldene•s brief is that no substantial
change of circumstances exists to justify a modification of the
Decree of Divorce. Jeroldene correctly states the burden of Randee
to establish a substantial change of circumstances before the trial
court may make a determination to modify the property division of
the Decree of Divorce.

This argument ignores the procedural

context in which this case is before the Court - Randee filed a
petition to modify, Jeroldene moved to dismiss, the court denied
the motion from which Jeroldene took this appeal.
hearing.

There was no

The only evidence before the court are the verified

pleadings.

Based on these pleadings, Jeroldene would have the

Court determine that Randee has not made a showing of a substantial
change of circumstances. The case law allows the party moving for
a petition to modify to have a hearing in which those issues may be
heard.

In Osmus v. Osmus, 198 P.2d 233,236 (Utah 1948), on a

petition to modify support, the Court stated:

12

"It is a principle now firmly established in this
jurisdiction that to entitle either party to modification
of a decree of alimony or support money, that such a
party plead and prove a change in circumstances such as
to require, in fairness and equity, a change in the terms
of the decree." (Emphasis added)
Similarly, in the Utah case of Gale v. Gale, 258 P.2d 986
(Utah 1953) the Court stated:
"The legal principle controlling in this case is that a
divorce decree may not be modified unless it is alleged,
proved and the trial court finds that the circumstances
upon which it is based have undergone a substantial
change (Quoting Chaffee v. Chaffee, 63 Utah 261, 225 P.
76; Osmus v. Osmus, 114 Utah 212, 198 P.2d 233)
In our situation, the change of circumstances has only been
alleged. The remaining legs of proof and findings await a hearing.
In Thompson v. Thompson, 709 P.2d 360, 361 (Utah 1985), the Court
has stated:
"The party seeking a modification of a decree must
demonstrate to the Court below that a substantial change
of circumstances has occurred since the entry of the
decree. Adams v. Adams, Utah 593 P.2d 147 (1979), Haslam
v. Haslam, Utah 657 P.2d 757 (1982). While the court did
not specifically state there was •substantial change of
circumstances' it • s findings and supporting evidence are
sufficient indica in this case that such a substantial
change had taken place since the decree which was not
within the original contemplation of the parties or the
court at the time the original decree was rendered. CF
Stettler v. Stettler
P.2d
, 18 Utah Advance Report
15 (September 20, 1985). It is clear the court so found
considering all of the relevant factors the record below
supports a finding of substantial change of circumstances
and the modification made by the trial court." (Emphasis
added)
In Thompson it is clear that the person seeking modification
of the decree shall have an opportunity to demonstrate to the court
below

that

contemplates

a
a

change

of

hearing,

circumstances
evidence
13

and

has

occurred.

findings.

This

Jeroldene's

numerous references to what the trial court "found" are erroneous
as there are no findings in this case because there was no hearing.
Randee is not stating in this argument that the trial court erred
in not making findings, but that the Jeroldene made an error in not
allowing the process to proceed to a point where findings could be
made.

Had Jeroldene asked for a bifurcated hearing, allowed the

Court to make a determination of whether there was a change of
circumstances, then presumably there would be findings which this
Court could review to determine whether Randee had shown an
adequate and substantial change of circumstances, allowing him to
proceed.

Thompson speaks in terms of a "showing".

Indeed, the

same requirement was set forth in Throckmorton v. Throckmorton. 161
P.2d 121, 124 (Utah App. 1988) requiring a showing before the court
could determine whether a substantial change of circumstances
existed. Quoting Navlor v. Navlor, 700 P.2d 707, 710 (Utah 1985).
It is further stated in Throckmorton at 124 that:
"It is reversible error if the trial court fails to make
findings on all material issues unless the facts and the
record are 'clear, uncontroverted and capable of
supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment'".
Quoting Acton v. Deliran, 737 P. 2d 996, 999 (Utah
1987 WQuoting Kinkella v. Bauqh, 660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah
1983)).
Utah courts have consistently found an abuse of discretion in
setting alimony when the trial court failed to make findings on the
financial conditions and needs of the receiving spouse. See Higley
v. Hiqlev, 676 P.2d 379, 382 (Utah, 1983) (Remanded since the trial
court made no findings with regard to the receiving spouse's
ability to work; Ruhsam v. Ruhsam, 742 P.2d 123, 126 (Ut. Ct. App.
14

1987)(Trial court failed to adequately address the financial needs
of the claimant's spouse making it necessary for the reviewing
court to remand the issue for further findings)
Jeroldene consistently

speaks in terms of a failure to

demonstrate a substantial change of circumstances, Randee concedes
that no such demonstration was ever made because a hearing was not
held.

If Randee's Petition to Modify, which was verified, and the

accompanying affidavits to the Order to Show Cause and Petition,
make out a prima facia case, then Randee should have been allowed
to

proceed

with

circumstances.

evidence

to

show

a

substantial

change

of

The filing of the appeal in this action has

procedurally blocked that process.

There is no decision of the

trial court determining whether there was a substantial change of
circumstances that this Court can review.
POINT 2:

THE ISSUE OF FRAUD (FORGERY OR SECRETING OF ASSETS) IS
APPROPRIATE BROUGHT IN A PETITION TO MODIFY.

In the case of Glover v. Glover, 242 P.2d 298 (Utah 1952) a
husband, shortly before obtaining a divorce, had induced the wife
to quit-claim to him her interest in property held by them as joint
tenants.

Because of the transfer, the wife did not present fully

the property issues to the court when a decree of divorce was
obtained.
what

The Court in Glover was faced with a determination of

constituted

extrinsic

fraud.

The Court

settled

on a

definition which included a statement that extrinsic fraud exists
where a party was prevented from presenting his case or was induced
not to present it by the actions of the other party so that there
was no adversary trial or decision of the issue.
15

The Court

determining that relief is granted on the theory that such fraud
has prevented the unsuccessful party from fully presenting his case
and hence, that there had never been a real contest before the
court on the subject matter.

Quoting Glover at 300:

"We are simply affording plaintiff an opportunity to
invoke the powers of a court of general jurisdiction to
include within a prior divorce decree the property rights
of the parties normally included therein but omitted in
this case because of the alleged fraud of the defendant."
Randee has alleged in this case that he sought on numerous
occasions to obtain the financial information on the company which
the parties had jointly operated.
provided by Jeroldene.

That information was never

It wasn't until after the decree was

entered that Randee became aware that substantial assets of the
corporation had been withdrawn by forgery or theft and that these
assets are alleged to not have been within the contemplation of the
court when the property settlement was made.
these assets, the
property

failure to put them

settlement

and

the

The secreting of

"on the table" in the

withholding

of

the

financial

information constitutes a fraud upon Randee and prevented him from
fully litigating the property issues before the court.

If it can

be shown that Jeroldene actually did remove and convert the funds
by fraud or forgery, those funds would be subject to consideration
of the trial court in the allocation of marital property rights of
the parties in the divorce.

The ability to make this proof were

omitted because of the actions of the Jeroldene.

The holding of

the Court in Glover at 300 was that this matter may be adjudicated
under the general jurisdiction of the district court initiated by:
16

"a pleading entitled a petition to show cause why the
prior divorce decree should not be modified so as to
include within it the property rights of the parties
omitted therefrom because of extrinsic fraud".
POINT 3: THE COURT HAS CONTINUING JURISDICTION TO MAKE SUBSEQUENT
CHANGES TO DISTRIBUTIONS OF PROPERTY.
It is clear pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §30-3-5(3) that
the

district

courts

of

the

State

of

Utah

have

continuing

jurisdiction to
"make subsequent changes or new orders for the custody of
the children and their support, maintenance, health and
dental care and for distribution of the property and
obligations or debts as is reasonable and necessary."
U.C.A. §30-3-5(3)
Case law has interpreted the statute:
"A party seeking modification of a divorce decree must
demonstrate that • a substantial change of circumstances
has occurred since the entry of the decree*, Thompson v.
Thompson, 709 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah 1985) and 'a trial
court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent
changes or new orders for . . . distribution of the
property . . . as is reasonable and necessary."1 Toone
v. Toone, 952 P.2d 112, 114 (Utah App. 1998).
Statute and case law allows a court to reconsider property
distributions if not previously adjudicated and if a substantial
change of circumstances is shown. See Naylor v. Naylor, 700 P.2d
707, 710 (Utah 1985); McCrarv v. McCrary, 599 P.2d 1248 (Utah
1979); Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121, 123 (Utah App.
1988).
POINT 4:

THE ISSUE OF FRAUD, FORGERY OR SECRETING OF ASSETS WAS
NOT LITIGATED IN THE ORIGINAL PROCEEDING.

It is clear that the district court has the jurisdiction to
hear petitions to modify divorce decrees, but will not change a
decree if the parties had previously litigated the issues.
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The

courts have so held in Throckmorton at 121 and 123, where the Court
stated:
"The moving party must establish a substantial change or
circumstances 'which was not within the original
contemplation of the parties or the court at the time the
original decree was ordered'".
Quoting Thompson v.
Thompson, 709 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah 1985) and stated
similarly in Toone v. Toone, 952 P.2d 112, 115 (Utah App.
1998) wherein the court stated that a decree of divorce
shall not be modified and the matters previously
litigated and incorporated therein cannot be collaterally
attacked in the face of the doctrine of res judicata."
The issue of whether Jeroldene fraudulently secreted assets
from the business was not reviewed in the initial proceeding.
Jeroldene has appealed the ruling of the court denying her motion.
Any findings of the court are to be found in the ruling on the
Motion to Dismiss. [R. 129] The court makes its ruling on a fairly
narrow issue where it states:
"Jeroldene has moved the court to dismiss the petition
for modification . . . on the grounds that the issue
raised by Randee were expressly waived in the stipulation
that proceeded entry of the divorce decree."
The court then ruled, quoting Glover, that it is appropriate for a
party to raise the issue of fraud in a petition to modify and
denied the motion to dismiss. Arguably, this could be said to be
a finding by the court that the fraud issue was not expressly
waived in the stipulation, and therefore was not considered by the
court in the divorce hearing.

Were the court to have made a

determination that the fraud issue was raised in the original
proceeding, or that the claims in the petition to modify were
waived by the stipulation, the court could have made a ruling
dismissing the petition. The court did not make such a ruling and
18

it can thereby be inferred that the court is finding that the
issues raised by Randee in the petition were not expressly waived
in the stipulation nor were they part of the proceedings in the
original decree.
Events leading to the May 13, 1997, hearing included the May
7, 1997 letter, [R. 105], followed Jeroldene's filing of a petition
to bifurcate the proceeding.

The court placed the matter on the

calendar on the 13th day of May, 1997, for the purpose of hearing
whether a divorce should be granted, not for hearing the property
issues.

The May 7, 1997, letter raised the issue that perhaps a

settlement could be reached and when Mr. Terry appeared on that
day, it was his desire to have the whole matter heard so that he
would not have to make a return trip. The effect of this was that
discovery, which had already been drafted by Randee's counsel, was
never filed.

However, Randee had made numerous informal requests

for discovery, including the request in the May 7 letter. Both Ms.
Riley and Mr. Terry had agreed to provide the material.
matters which were known to Randee were set forth.

The

This list of

items was carried forward into the Stipulation, Findings and
Decree. There is no reference to any other assets which were known
to Randee at the time. The lists within the Stipulation, Findings
and Decree are specific wherein it states that:
"Defendant waives any claims against Plaintiff with
respect to those items listed . . . to-wit:" [R.45,53,61]
The list is specific and contains no reference to the $17,000 or to
fraud, forgery and other assets which may have been secreted by
Jeroldene.

These issues were not contemplated by the parties or
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the court at the time of the original divorce hearing.

Randee

initiated investigation in July to attempt to uncover the financial
circumstances of his business. This being an additional indication
that he didn't have sufficient documentation or knowledge at the
time of the hearing to even raise the issue.
issues

In any event, these

should be heard by the lower court, not only for a

determination of whether they were raised in the lower court or had
the ability to be, but also from the standpoint of whether or not
they would constitute a change of circumstances.
POINT 5:

THE REFUSAL OF JEROLDENE TO PROVIDE THE REQUESTED
DOCUMENTATION PLACED RANDEE IN A POSITION OF NOT HAVING
THE ABILITY TO FULLY LITIGATE THE ISSUES OR TO HAVE THE
ISSUES DETERMINED ON THEIR MERITS.

Two cases are on point to regard with the failure of a party
to provide needed documents or to allow one of the parties to have
an adequate opportunity of presenting their case in full.

In the

case of Christensen v. Christensen, 619 P.2d 1372, 1374 (Utah,
1980) a party had made a written demand for the production of
various divorce records. Defense counsel agrees that he had agreed
to produce the necessary documents without the necessity of
subpoena, but failed to do so at trial.

Defense counsel also

admitted the existence of the documents which concerned the income
of the plaintiff.

The court found that since the documents dealt

directly with an issue which the plaintiff was trying to establish,
the conduct of withholding the documents from the defendant was
unjustified and resulted in prejudicial error to the plaintiff in
that

she

was

unable

to

modification of alimony.

pursue

effectively

her

claim

for

The case was remanded to allow the
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plaintiff

a

hearing

on

her

claims

for

additional

alimony.

Similarly, in the case of Glover v. Glover, 242 P.2d 298, 300 (Utah
1952), one party's obtention of a deed to marital property, and
then not including that property as part of the marital estate was
deemed by the court to be extrinsic fraud and it was said:
"When its effect is to prevent the unsuccessful party
from having a trial or from presenting his case fully, as
for instance keeping him away from the court by false
promise, or compromise, or purposefully keeping him in
ignorance of the pendency of the action"
then, the court determined, that the party could bring a petition
to modify including those property rights which had been ignored or
not allowed to proceed because of the action of the other party.
In our case this is exactly what has occurred. Randee has alleged
in his Petition to Modify that substantial amounts of money were
secreted by fraud or forgery and those items would have been part
of the marital estate and should have been considered by the court
and would have been had they been disclosed by Jeroldene.
Randee requested personally and through counsel that the
records be surrendered. Both attorneys Reilly and Terry agreed to
provide them without the necessity of formal discovery, but never
did.

The court ordered that they be turned over; they were not.

The failure to provide the records prevented Randee from effective
access to the courts.
CONCLUSION
If there are any findings, they must be gleaned from the
court's ruling on the motion to dismiss. From the court's ruling
it must be determined that the court found that the issues raised
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by Randee were not waived in the Stipulation that preceded the
entry of the divorce decree, and thereby the court did not have
these issues before it.

The court further ruled that an issue

brought before it claiming fraud in the original proceeding was
specifically authorized in Glover. This being the case, this Court
does not have to get to the issues raised by the Jeroldene wherein
she alleges that Randee failed to meet his burden showing that
there had been a substantial change of circumstances.

The trial

court simply did not reach these issues. There was no hearing, the
lower court simply has not reviewed, on the merits, any of the
allegations contained in Randee*s Petition to Modify the divorce
decree.

If the Court of Appeals upholds the district court's

ruling, the lower court would simply set the matter for hearing,
during which Randee would be required to put on his proof that a
substantial change of circumstance had occurred which was not
contemplated in the original divorce proceeding.

Upon such a

showing or non-showing, the court would be free to take the next
step to either deny Randee•s Petition to Modify or to proceed to
determine whether the property settlement should be modified. The
Order of the District Judge should be upheld.
DATED this '^%ay of November, 1998.

CRAIG CU HALLS
Attorney for Appellee
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